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Congress supported the resolution with 136-137. The Tonkin Gulf Incident in the past two decades has been treated by at least three full-scale studies, dealt with at length by Congressional committees and extensively referenced in general histories, presidential memoirs and textbooks on the U.S. legislative function. This volume deals only with the former. Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." The SIGINT intercepts also detected that the North Vietnamese coastal radar stations were tracking Maddox and reporting its movements to the outbound torpedo boats. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. The boats followed at their maximum speed of 44 knots, continuing the chase for more than 20 minutes. We have no intention of yielding to pressure. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. Easily outdistancing the North Vietnamese boat, the commandos arrived back at Da Nang shortly after daybreak.8, North Vietnam immediately and publicly linked the 34A raids and the Desoto patrol, a move that threatened tentative peace feelers from Washington that were only just reaching Hanoi. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. All missed, probably because the North Vietnamese had fired too soon. . You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. Both U.S. ships opened fire on the radar contacts, but reported problems maintaining a lock on the tracking and fire control solution. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. This was almost certainly a reaction to the recent 34A raids. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. The people who are calling me up, they want to be damned sure I don't pull 'em out and run, and they want to be damned sure that we're firm. Hanoi at the time denied all, leading to a third interpretation that remains alive today as what might be called the Stockdale thesis. Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. One of the great ironies of the Gulf of Tonkin incident for President Johnson is that it was for him, politically, a great success, he continues. "We believe that present OPLAN 34A activities are beginning to rattle Hanoi," wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "and [the] Maddox incident is directly related to their effort to resist these activities. The fig leaf of plausible denial served McNamara in this case, but it was scant cover. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. The stage was set. Each sides initial after-action review was positive. The Health Conspiracy. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. The bullets struck the destroyer; the torpedo missed. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. In turn, that means The history stops with the U.S. Navy moving into full combat duty -- the naval and air interdictions in South and North Vietnam -- the subject of future volumes. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 For the maritime war specialist, it is of course invaluable. Seventh Fleet reduced it to 12 nautical miles. In July, General Westmoreland asked that Desoto patrols be expanded to cover 34A missions from Vinh Son north to the islands of Hon Me, Hon Nieu, and Hon Mat, all of which housed North Vietnamese radar installations or other coastwatching equipment. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. 2, pp. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. Operations Security (OPSEC) concerns and related communications restrictions prevented Maddox and its operational commanders up to the Seventh Fleet from knowing of the commando raid. Conducted under the nationally approved Operations Plan, OPLAN-34A, the program required the intelligence community to provide detailed intelligence about the commando targets, the Norths coastal defenses and related surveillance systems. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. PTF-3 and PTF-6 broke off and streaked south for safety; they were back in port before 1200. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. And it didnt take much detective work to figure out where the commandos were stationed. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Quoted in Steve Edwards, "Stalking the Enemys Coast," U.S. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. Moving in closer, the crew could see their targeta communications towersilhouetted in the moonlight. (The recent NBC television movie In Love and War had Navy pilot James B. Stockdale flying over the scene at the time saying, "I see nothing"; now a retired vice admiral, Stockdale has reiterated the "phoney attack" charge in writings and public speaking.). Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. The Maddox was attacked at 1600. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. He is the author of. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Formerly an analyst with the Washington-based Asian Studies Center, Mr. Conboy is vice president of Lippo Group, a large financial services institution in Jakarta, Indonesia. 10. McNamara insisted that the evidence clearly indicated there was an attack on August 4, and he continued to maintain so in his book In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons From Vietnam. ", "No," replied McCone. Originally begun by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1961, 34A was a highly-classified program of covert operations against North Vietnam. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. Two nearly identical episodes six weeks apart; two nearly opposite responses. Suddenly, North Vietnamese guns opened fire from the shore. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964, FRUS, Vietnam, 1964, p. 603. 3. The Maddox fired againthis time to killhitting the second North Vietnamese boat just as it launched two torpedoes. Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. 4. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. Subsequent SIGINT reporting and faulty analysis that day further reinforced earlier false impressions. Neither the United States nor State of Vietnam signed anything at the 1954 Geneva Conference. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. The study debunks two strongly held but opposing beliefs about what happened on both dayson the one hand that neither of the reported attacks ever took place at all, and on the other that there was in fact a second deliberate North Vietnamese attack on August 4. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin and the Vietnam War. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. Hickman, Kennedy. Surprised by the North Vietnamese response, Johnson decided that the United States could not back away from the challenge and directed his commanders in the Pacific to continue with the Desoto missions. Like all intelligence, it must be analyzed and reported in context. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. (2021, February 16). In response, the North Vietnamese boat launched a torpedo. In a conversation with Johnson, McNamara confirmedthis, with a reference to OP-CON 34A,acovert operation against the North Vietnamese. Vaccines. The ships sonar operator reported a noise spikenot a torpedowhich the Combat Information Center (CIC) team mistook for report of an incoming torpedo. The errors made in the initial analysis were due to a combination of inexperience, limited knowledge of North Vietnams operations and an operational imperative to ensure that the U.S. Navy ships would not be caught by surprise. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. The Dollar Bill . Signals Intelligence is a valuable source but it is not perfect. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. ." It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. . The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. The entirety of the original intercepts, however, were not examined and reanalyzed until after the war. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. That night, on national television, Johnson addressedthe American people, saying,Renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to take action and reply. Unable to catch the fast South Vietnamese PTFs, the government in Hanoi elected to strike instead at USS Maddox. U.S. and South Vietnamese warships intruded into the territorial waters of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and simultaneously shelled: Hon Nieu Island, 4 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province [and] Hon Me Island, 12 kilometers off the coast of Thanh Hoa Province." The Gulf of Tonkin incident was a complex naval event in the Gulf of Tonkin, off the coast of Vietnam, that was presented to the U.S. Congress on August 5, 1964, as two unprovoked attacks by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on the destroyers Maddox and Turner Joy of the U.S. The tug departed Haiphong at approximately 0100 hours on August 4, while the undamaged torpedo boat, T-146, was ordered to stay with the crippled boats and maintain an alert for enemy forces. At about 0600, the two U.S. destroyers resumed the Desoto patrol. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. In addition, the US Navy was instructed to conduct Desoto patrols off North Vietnam. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. Ships radar detected five patrol boats, which turned out to be P-4 torpedo boats and Swatows. Summary Notes of the 538th Meeting of the NSC, 4 August 1964, 6:15-6:40 p.m.. 13. 2. This was reinforced by statements by retired Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who admitted to the Aug. 2 attack but denied ordering another two days later. They were nicknamed "gassers" because they burned gasoline rather than diesel fuel. The most popular of these is that the incident was either a fabrication or deliberate American provocation. But, to me, the more pernicious deception was this idea that American ships were sailing innocently in the Gulf of Tonkin and were attacked without provocation, he continues. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. The 522-page NSA official history Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975, triggered a new round of media reporting and renewed debate about what really happened in the Gulf of Tonkin. This was the first of several carefully worded official statements aimed at separating 34A and Desoto and leaving the impression that the United States was not involved in the covert operations.9 In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense Two hours later, Captain Herrick reported the sinking of two enemy patrol boats. That night and morning, while cruising in heavy weather, the ships received radar, radio, and sonar reports that signaled another North Vietnamese attack. Interpretation by historians as to what exactly did and did not occur during those few days in early August 1964 remains so varied that the wonder is that authors Marolda and Fitzgerald were able themselves to settle on the text. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. The maximum closure distance was originally established at 20 nautical miles, but the commander of the U.S. Our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. A Senate investigation revealed that the Maddox had been on an intelligence What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. We still seek no wider war.. 14. In the subsequent exchange of fire, neither American nor North Vietnamese ships inflicted significant damage. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. The battle was over in 22 minutes. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. PRX is a 501(c)(3) organization recognized by the IRS: #263347402. The captain of Maddox, Commander Herbert L. Ogier Jr., ordered his ship to battle stations shortly after 1500 hours. Holding their vector despite the gunfire, the boats rushed in, pouring 20-mm and 40-mm fire and 57-mm recoilless rifle rounds into their target. After a suspected torpedo attack by North Vietnamese patrol torpedo boats led to plans for US retaliation,the captain of the Maddox sent a cable to the Joint Chiefs that advised "complete evaluation before any further action"due to grave doubts over whether an attackhad reallyoccurred. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. During a meeting at the White House on the evening of 4 August, President Johnson asked McCone, "Do they want a war by attacking our ships in the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin? This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. 14. Both sides claimed successes in the exchange that they did not actually achieve. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. The 122 additional relevant SIGINT products confirmed that the Phu Bai station had misinterpreted or mistranslated many of the early August 3 SIGINT intercepts. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Speculation about administration motives surrounding the Tonkin Gulf incident itself and the subsequent withholding of key information will probably never cease, but the factual intelligence record that drove those decisions is now clear. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. These PTFs were manned by South Vietnamese crews and conducted a series of coastal attacks against targets in North Vietnam as part of Operation 34A. What did and didnt happen in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4 has long been in dispute, but the decisions that the Johnson Administration and Congress made based on an interpretation of those events were undeniably monumental. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Subscribe to LBJ's War onApple Podcasts. The Pyramid and All-Seeing Eye . The USS Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin is shown in 1963. 11. A long-standing program, the Desoto patrols consisted of American warships cruising in international waters to conduct electronic surveillance operations. When Did the U.S. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. As the enemy boat passed astern, it was raked by gunfire from the Maddox that killed the boats commander. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. Those early mistakes led U.S. destroyers to open fire on spurious radar contacts, misinterpret their own propeller noises as incoming torpedoes, and ultimately report an attack that never occurred. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. They never intended to attack U.S. forces, and were not even within 100 nautical miles of the U.S. destroyers position at the time of the purported second engagement.. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. He has written numerous articles on Vietnam War-era special operations and is the author of two books on the war: Trial by Fire: The 1972 Easter Offensive, Americas Last Vietnam Battle (Hippocrene Books, 1994), and Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War (Lexington Books, 1990). In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. This is not the place to establish the final truth on the Gulf of Tonkin matter and certainly I am not the person to render the ultimate judgment. It can be deceived and it is all too often incomplete. Four boats, PTF-1, PTF-2 (the American-made patrol boats), PTF-5, and PTF-6 (Nasty boats), were on their way to bombard a North Vietnamese radar installation at Vinh Son and a security post on the banks of the nearby Ron River, both about 90 miles north of the DMZ. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. This time the U.S. ships detected electronic signals and acoustic indications of a likely second North Vietnamese naval attack, and they requested U.S. air support. 8. So, whether by accident or design, American actions in the Tonkin Gulf triggered a response from the North Vietnamese, not the other way around. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. The United States denied involvement. Naval Institute. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. Despite Morses doubts, Senate reaction fell in behind the Johnson team, and the question of secret operations was overtaken by the issue of punishing Hanoi for its blatant attack on a U.S. warship in international waters. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. But Morse did not know enough about the program to ask pointed questions. Such arguments are rooted in the information and documents released by Daniel Ellsberg and others, and were reinforced over the decades by anniversary interviews with some of the participants, including ships crewmen and officers. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated PTF-3, PTF-4, PTF-5, PTF-6 (PTFfast patrol boat). By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. Incidentally, the first volume, Setting the Stage: To 1959, contains one of the best brief summaries I've read of Vietnam history from the end of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference.
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